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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-1802
____________
ELIZABETH LIGGON-REDDING,
                                                                                           Appellant
vs.
WILLINGBORO TOWNSHIP; WILLIAM R. TANTUM, ASSESSOR;
SALLY LANDRY; KUENY, BADGE # 156; WHITE, BADGE # 161
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. Nos. 06-cv-03129)
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler
_______________________________________
No. 08-1803
___________
ELIZABETH LIGGON-REDDING,
                                                                                 Appellant
vs.
CONGRESS TITLE; KEY PROPERTIES GMAC REALTY
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-01863)
2District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler
_______________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 2, 2009
Before:   Chief Judge SCIRICA, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
Opinion Filed: September 28, 2009                           
____________
 OPINION
____________
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Elizabeth Liggon-Redding appeals the District Court’s orders
dismissing her three complaints.  We have consolidated her two appeals for disposition
and will affirm the District Court’s order of July 17, 2007 in (06-cv-3129).  We will
vacate the Court’s orders of March 7, 2008 in (06-cv-3129) and (07-cv-1863) and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
An understanding of the complicated nature of the plaintiff’s appeals
requires a review of the background circumstances.  Tyrone Redding is a disabled veteran
of the Vietnam War.  He receives compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs
(“VA”) which is payable to his mother Marlene Redding, who the VA has entrusted as his
fiduciary.  As a disabled veteran, Mr. Redding is also entitled to a property tax exemption
under New Jersey law.  See N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.30(a).
In 1977, Mr. Redding married plaintiff.  They lived in property located at
     At a May 23, 2006 hearing in front of the Tax Court of the State of New Jersey,1
Appellate Division, the following exchange occurred,
“The Court: Mr. And Mrs. Redding, you have to
understand [Willingboro Township is] gonna keep on trying
[to challenge Mr. Redding’s eligibility for a disabled
3
82 Hamilton Lane in Willingboro Township, New Jersey. 
Title to the 82 Hamilton Lane property had been transferred from Edgar
Robinson to “Elizabeth House [the plaintiff’s former name] in trust for Stewart A.
Liggon, JR.” on October 31, 1977.  
On January 19, 1998, plaintiff conveyed the title to “T. N. Redding [her
husband], Etux.”  Plaintiff stated in the District Court that she transferred the property to
Mr. Redding “so we could get the [veteran’s] property tax exemption.”  
Willingboro Township’s Tax Assessor, William R. Tantum, denied Mr.
Redding the tax exemption for several years on the basis that he had not established that
82 Hamilton Lane was his domicile.  Tantum justified his decision with evidence that Mr.
Redding spent a considerable amount of time at his mother’s home in Pennsylvania.
The tax dispute was finally resolved when the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Appellate Division, held that Mr. Redding was entitled to the exemption.  See
Twp. of Willingboro v. Redding, No. A-5356-05T1, 2007 WL 250379, at *2 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Jan. 31, 2007).  
During the pendency of the tax case, the Reddings stated that they were
going to sell the 82 Hamilton Lane premises,  and they indeed conveyed it on June 30,1
veteran’s property tax exemption] and they’re entitled to do
that every year.
Mr. Redding: I’m selling that place [82
Hamilton Lane].
Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: Your – Your Honor,
we’re moving.  We’re selling the house and we’re gone. 
We’re not – 
Mr. Redding: I’m not go[ing] through this.
The Court: Well – 
Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: – go[ing] through this
no more.
The Court: – that may make Mr. Tantum very
happy, I don’t know, but – 
Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: And us too.
The Court: – but they do have the right to do it
every year.
Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: Thank you, Your
Honor.
The Court: Okay.
Mr. Redding: I’ll be gone sometime this year.
Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: You got rid of us. 
We’re out.
Mr. Redding: Thank you.
Ms. [Liggon-]Redding: Thank you so much. 
Yes, Mr. Tantum, you can collect taxes from the next people. 
We’re out.  You got what you wanted.  You wanted us out.
The Court: It’s been a really fruitful morning.”
4
2006. 
On July 16, 2006, plaintiff filed suit in the District Court.  Her complaint,
docketed at (06-cv-3127), named Fidelity National Title, Congress Title Division, the
closing agent for the sale of the property; its parent company, Fidelity National Title
Insurance Company; and Key Properties GMAC Real Estate, a real estate agency
      The following exchange occurred at a June 1, 2007 hearing before the District Court:2
“[The Court:] Who got the money from the sale [of 82
Hamilton Lane]?
[Mrs. Liggon-Redding:] My husband.
 . . . 
[The Court:] What did he do with the money?
[Mrs. Liggon-Redding:] He gave it to my son.”  
5
involved in the transaction, as defendants.  She asserted that the Hamilton Lane property
was sold without her consent and that she was defrauded into signing documents.  She
also claimed the right to $10,000 in an escrow account established at the settlement of the
property.  In a later proceeding before the District Court, plaintiff admitted that her
husband received the proceeds of the sale of 82 Hamilton Lane and that Mr. Redding
gave that money to the plaintiff’s son Stewart.2
The District Court dismissed the complaint in (06-cv-3127) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.  Liggon-Redding v. Cong. Title, No. 06-3127, 2007 WL
432985, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2007).  On appeal, we dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).  Liggon-Redding v. Cong. Title, 229 Fed. Appx. 105 (3d Cir. 2007).  
   The present appeals involve three suits that plaintiff subsequently filed in
the District Court.  In the amended complaint filed at (06-cv-3129), Willingboro
Township and Tantum are named as defendants.  Plaintiff alleges that she and her
husband were deprived of quiet enjoyment of their home because the Township and
Tantum’s alleged discriminatory acts in attempting to collect taxes caused Mr. Redding to
sell their house against her wishes.  
      Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941.  3
      On June 11, 2008, Mrs. Liggon-Redding also filed suit in the Superior Court of New4
Jersey, Burlington County, Chancery Division, against all of the defendants named in (07-
cv-1863) except Klein.  She asserted a claim to quiet title to 82 Hamilton Lane and a
claim pursuant to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. § 56:8-1 et seq.  The
case was dismissed with prejudice on September 12, 2008.  Redding v. Fid. Nat’l Title,
No. C-77-08, slip op. at 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. Burlington County Ch. Div. Sept. 12, 2008). 
The Court held that Mrs. Liggon-Redding’s claims were “barred by the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, as this matter is tantamount to re-litigation of the same
claims and issues that have been raised and brought to final judgment on the merits [in the
District Court].”  Id. at 2.  We are not aware of any appeal of that case.   
6
The plaintiff’s complaint at (07-cv-1863) asserted a RICO  claim pursuant3
to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 against Anthony Balboni, Linda Huller, Tahir Zaman, Kristine
LaPointe, Charles Wexton, Esq., and Oren Klein, Esq.  According to the complaint,
Balboni, Huller, and Zaman are employed by Key Properties; LaPointe and Wexton are
employees of Congress Title; and Klein misrepresented himself as an attorney for Key
Properties.  Plaintiff alleges that these defendants committed numerous acts of fraud in
connection with the sale of the family home, “enlisted Willingboro Police Officers to
Harass, Frighten, and Threaten [plaintiff] into not pursuing Justice,” and “have all gotten
together to try to cover up their ongoing fraudulent and illegal activities.”   4
Her final complaint, which was originally entered in the District Court’s
docket at (07-cv-1890) and subsequently consolidated with her suit at (06-cv-3129),
asserted a RICO claim against Willingboro Township; Tantum; Willingboro police
officers Landry, Kueny, and White; as well as numerous John Doe defendants. 
      Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides, “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with5
these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim
against it.  Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision
 . . . operates as an adjudication on the merits.”  
7
According to the complaint, the Township, Tantum, the named police officers, and the
Doe defendants committed a series of wrongful acts against plaintiff and her family.  
The District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint that was
filed at (06-cv-3129) for lack of standing.  Her complaints that were originally entered in 
the docket at (07-cv-1863) and (07-cv-1890) were dismissed as a sanction pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)  because the plaintiff’s failure to comply with numerous Rules of5
Civil Procedure and court orders in prosecuting her complaints warranted “the extreme
sanction of dismissal.”  
II.
In deciding to impose the sanction of dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaints
that were filed at (07-cv-1863) and (07-cv-1890), the District Court considered the Poulis
factors.  See Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).  But
a Rule 41(b) “[d]ismissal is a harsh remedy and should be resorted to in only extreme
cases.”  Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Marshall v.
Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917, 918 (3d Cir. 1974)).  All doubts should be resolved in favor of
reaching a decision on the merits.  See Briscoe v. Klaus, 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2008).
 The plaintiff’s abusive language and failures to heed helpful suggestions
8have sorely taxed the patience of the District Court, whose restraint has been
commendable.  Nevertheless we prefer to address the merits in this case rather than
impose sanctions. 
The plaintiff’s complaints at (07-cv-1863) and (07-cv-1890) contain two
types of claims.  The first consists of RICO claims.  A necessary element of a cognizable
RICO claim where the collection of an unlawful debt is not alleged is the presence of “a
pattern of racketeering activity.”  H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 232
(1989).
A pattern of racketeering activity occurs when a defendant commits a set of
predicate racketeering acts, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), that “are related, and . . . amount to
or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.”  Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1292 (3d
Cir. 1995) (quoting H. J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239) (emphasis omitted).  Continuity can be
proved by showing “either . . . a closed period of repeated conduct, or . . . past conduct
that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.”  H. J. Inc., 492 U.S.
at 241.  
We find no basis in the extensive pleadings in this case for any RICO
claims.  Plaintiff has not alleged a set of predicate racketeering acts that satisfy RICO’s
continuity requirement.  See id. at 242 (“[p]redicate acts extending over a few weeks or
months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy [RICO’s continuity]
requirement”).  She therefore has not stated a RICO claim upon which relief can be
      We note that the plaintiff has not demonstrated any particularly objectionable6
conduct with respect to her excessive force claim.  
9
granted.  Upon remand, the District Court shall dismiss the plaintiff’s RICO claims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  
      The second type of claim that appears in the complaints filed at (07-cv-
1863) and (07-cv-1890) is one of the use of excessive force by the police against the
plaintiff personally.  She asserts that she was physically assaulted during arrests that
occurred on August 29 and September 21, 2006. 
A pro se complaint “is to be liberally construed . . . and . . . must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,”  Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 
Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff’s pleadings are sufficient to state an excessive
force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court shall reinstate this claim on
remand.6
III.
The District Court’s dismissed the plaintiff’s discrimination claim in (06-
cv-3129) for lack of standing.  We will affirm.
In her amended complaint at (06-cv-3129), plaintiff alleged that
Willingboro Township and Tantum “attempt[ed] to take away the Veterans Tax
Exemption which her husband is entitled to because of his service in Viet Nam” on the
10
basis of Mr. Redding’s race and disability.  When pressed by the District Court as to why
she was the party bringing this claim, plaintiff stated that she had authority to bring the
claim on behalf of Mr. Redding pursuant to a power-of-attorney agreement.  However she
was unable to prove that Mr. Redding was competent when he executed the alleged
power-of-attorney agreement, and the District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
standing.  
The District Court properly dismissed this complaint.  Pro se plaintiffs are
generally prohibited “from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative
capacity.”  Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9  Cir. 2008).  As this Courtth
has observed, “[i]t goes without saying that it is not in the interest of . . . incompetents
that they be represented by non-attorneys.”  Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d
876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906
F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)).
IV.
In sum, we will affirm the District Court’s July 17, 2007 order dismissing
the plaintiff’s amended complaint at (06-cv-3129).  We will vacate the Court’s March 7,
2008 orders in (07-cv-1863) and (06-cv-3129) dismissing the plaintiff’s complaints that
were filed at dockets (07-cv-1863) and (07-cv-1890) pursuant to Rule 41(b) and remand
for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
